was now the second anniversary of the Lehman Brothers bust - somehow seems the 15th to September must have grown to my fateful day. This day is similar to the 9 November 1989 or 11 September 2001 etched in my memory. I can not say very well what I have done precisely the time when I learned that Lehman Brothers is bankrupt. could claim as today our politicians that they manage the biggest financial crisis since the 30's and actively protect us from major damage -
more surprising that the lessons from these events is still wrong conclusions are drawn. Here my Meinungnach the last sentence has yet been taken. Anyway, I think the conclusions that are drawn have been from the bankrupt, for just plain wrong. So I see the rules for Basel III and the associated demand for more equity as a sham. would have at least according to Lehman all be clear that liquidity is more important than accounting tricks. The posting of capital that does not actually cash available to more moderate, may indeed soothe an accountant, I do not.
As I had to do even in the case of Kommunalkredit can, even the best equity ratio not save them from bankruptcy, when liquidity is no longer available. I think it should be better than 20 cents per 1 € moderate risk cash deposited with the National Bank, as any equity ratios observed. The absurd idea that banks pose a systemic risk and therefore should not go bankrupt is, after Lehman rethink much bread. As is evident in the Hypo Alpe Adria, it is quite Argumentbierbar that banks and their owners should be held accountable for massive mistakes to account. One need only savings deposits to total assets ratio to look to know how the mortgage is funded. The savings deposit should be guaranteed, however, a bank may go bankrupt. This would not only save many millions of tax, but also those who are called to account that financed the growth.
